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I. Background
Turkey ranks high among countries suffering loss of life and prop-
erty due to earthquakes over many centuries. So far in this century 
there have been earthquakes in Turkey that caused over 110,000 deaths, 
about 250,000 hospitalizations, and close to 600,000 destroyed housing 
units.
As indicated in Table 1, the series of devastating earthquakes during 
the last decade has caused housing losses in the hundreds of thou-
sands, loss of lives in the tens of thousands, and a financial loss in 
excess of US $22 billion (about 10% of the average GDP or about 1% 
annual GDP loss).
Following the losses suffered during the two major earthquakes 
that struck Turkey in 1999, there has been a broad recognition among 
Turkey’s governmental, non-governmental, and academic organiza-
tions of the need for extensive response planning based on detailed 
risk analyses of likely seismic hazards in Turkey in general and Istan-
bul in particular.
In recent decades, earthquake disaster risks in the urban centers of 
Turkey have increased, mainly due to very high rates of urbanization, 
faulty land-use planning and construction, inadequate infrastructure 
and services, and environmental degradation. Several studies have 
shown that the vulnerabilities of Turkish building stock are at least an 
order of magnitude higher than their counterparts in California, which 
shares a comparable level of earthquake hazard.1 This greater 
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Table 1. Recent Earthquake Losses in Turkey
Approximate
Lives Housing Units Number of Total Damage
Earthquake Lost Damaged/Collapsed Homeless (USD Billions)
1992 Erzincan 0,0645 8,000/1,500 010,000 01.0
1995 Dinar 0,0100 6,500/2,000 008,000 00.4
1998 Adana-Ceyhan 0,0150 21,000/2,000 024,000 00.5
1999 Kocaeli 18,000 320,000/40,000 600,000 20.0
1999 Düzce 0,0812 10,100/800 — 01.0
vulnerability can be traced to several reasons. Essentially, the build-
ing development system was conducive to poor construction due to 
chronically high rates of inflation (consequently, very limited mort-
gage and insurance, impediments to large-scale development, and 
industrialization of the construction sector); high rates of urbanization 
that created a demand for inexpensive housing; ineffective control and 
supervision of design and construction; limited enforcement of regula-
tions; no accountability; and the government acting as a free insurer 
of earthquake risk. The other important source of the increased risk in 
Istanbul is the unprecedented probability of the occurrence of a large 
earthquake, which stands at about 65% during the coming year.
The inevitability of such a large earthquake in Istanbul makes it 
imperative that certain preparedness and emergency procedures be 
contrived in the event of and prior to an earthquake disaster. This 
requires the quantification of earthquake effects on the physical and 
social environments and, subsequently, the development of urban 
earthquake risk mitigation master plans that develop and elaborate 
upon short- and long-term strategies. The basic tenets of earthquake 
risk mitigation are: do not increase the existing risk (build properly); 
decrease the existing risk (retrofit); and transfer the risk (insurance). 
Reduction of the structural vulnerability, siting and land-use regu-
lations, design and construction regulations, relocation of communi-
ties, and public education/awareness programs are viable measures for 
the mitigation of earthquake risk. Urban settlements can be improved 
by changing the functional characteristics of the settlements through 
land-use planning as well as increasing the redundancy of the infra-
structure, such as building an additional bridge at a strategic crossing, 
for example.
New buildings in Istanbul are generally being built much better than 
the existing building stock. The reasons for this improvement are the 
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application of a new (1998) earthquake resistant design code; increased 
public awareness and demand for earthquake safety; various train-
ing and education programs for engineers; better zoning regulations 
and enforcement by municipalities; and control by private construc-
tion supervision firms. New legislation (Revision of Law on Engineer-
ing and Architecture, Building Design and Construction Control, and 
Standard Development Regulations for Municipalities) enacted after 
the 1999 earthquakes provided help in this regard. For Istanbul the 
most important and complex issue in mitigating earthquake casualties 
is the retrofit of existing buildings.
The 1999 Kocaeli earthquake clearly demonstrates that Turkey needs 
a new emergency management plan that is effective from top down 
and bottom up. The plan and its provisions need to be created from 
scratch and practiced frequently. The highly centralized, hierarchical, 
top-down characteristic of disaster management in Turkey discourages 
local initiatives and limits community participation. Despite the rigid 
structure of the system, ad hoc management and a lack of coordination 
were substantial problems, as witnessed in the first days of the 1999 
Kocaeli earthquake. Communication, coordination, and cooperation 
problems between appointed and elected administrators have, in cer-
tain cases, hindered effective Search-and-Rescue and relief operations. 
Lack of a rapid loss estimation system, lack of disaster scenarios and 
disaster operation plans, shortage of equipment and materials, and an 
absence of disaster response training all hindered organized and effec-
tive search, rescue, and relief efforts.
Although worldwide it is well known that the potential impact of 
large earthquakes on urban societies can be reduced by timely and 
correct action immediately before (Early Warning) and after (Rapid 
Response) a disastrous earthquake, these concepts and technologies 
were brought onto the Turkish scene only after the 1999 Kocaeli earth-
quake. Earthquake Early Warning in urban and industrial areas allows 
for clean emergency shutdown of systems susceptible to damage, such 
as power stations, transportation, computer centers, and telephone 
systems. The Rapid Response systems, on the other hand, provide 
reliable information for accurate, effective characterization of the shak-
ing and damage for rapid emergency assistance, search, and rescue 
responses. After a brief quantification of the earthquake risk in Istan-
bul, this article will provide a description of the Istanbul Earthquake 
Rapid Response and Early Warning System.
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II. Estimated Residential Building Losses and 
Casualties in Istanbul due to Earthquake
Istanbul faces a significant earthquake hazard and risk as illustrated by 
the earthquake risk scenario.2
A. Earthquake Hazard
Earthquake hazard in the Istanbul region is essentially controlled by 
the Main Marmara Fault (part of the North Anatolian Fault) passing 
about 20 km south of the city in the Marmara Sea. Based on low-reso-
lution bathymetric data and earthquake occurrences, several research-
ers have developed different tectonic models for the Marmara Sea. 
Data obtained during the recent high-resolution bathymetric survey by 
the Ifremer RV Le Suroit vessel indicates that a single, thoroughgoing 
strike-slip fault system (Main Marmara Fault) cuts the Marmara Sea 
from east to west, joining the August 17, 1999 Kocaeli earthquake fault 
with the August 9, 1912 Sarkoy-Murefte earthquake fault. The Main 
Marmara Fault is argued to be a very young structure (about 200,000 
years old), cutting across the older structures that formed the present 
NNE-SSW extensional pull-apart morphology of the Marmara Sea. It 
exhibits the typical characteristics of a major strike-slip fault. The fault 
follows the northern boundary of the Çınarcık Basin between Yesilköy 
and the entrance of the Gulf of Izmit (Figure 1). For the Main Marmara 
Fault, the slip rate is in the range of 2–3 cm/year.3
In Istanbul, earthquake records spanning two millennia indicate 
that, on average, at least one medium intensity (epicentral intensity, 
Io=VII–VIII) earthquake has affected the city every fifty years.4 The 
average return period for high intensity (epicentral intensity, Io=VIII–
IX) events has been 300 years. The earthquake damage experienced by 
the historical structures in Istanbul has been well documented. It has 
been determined that the Hagia Sophia museum was affected by inten-
sities reaching to IX during earthquakes in 1509 and 1754.5 The 1999 
Kocaeli earthquake (Mw=7.4) occurred on the North Anatolian Fault 
Zone with a macroseismic epicenter near the town of Golcuk in west-
ern Turkey.6 In Istanbul the general intensity was VI, with a limited 
region of intensity VII just to the west.7
After a detailed assessment of the distribution of reported earth-
quake damage, historical earthquakes that affected the Marmara 
region between 1500 and the present were associated with different 
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segments of the Main Marmara Fault.8 Assuming lognormal probabil-
ity density functions with a typical coefficient variation of 0.5, the 
conditional probability for the individual rupture of segments located 
to the immediate south of Istanbul can be determined to be about 42% 
in the next fifty years. This exceptionally high probability favorably 
compares with that reported in Parsons and colleagues using stress-
transfer techniques.9
B. Scenario Earthquake
The geological and seismological information predicts the appropriate 
earthquake scenario, which is usually given broad terms involving rup-
ture length, location, and magnitude. For “worst case” scenarios, the 
maximum event size is adopted. The Scenario Earthquake is defined as 
the largest earthquake expected in a reasonable period of time (gener-
ally 500 years). For intrinsically probabilistic applications, the selection 
of a Scenario Earthquake is based on the disaggregation of the hazard 
to show which events contribute most to the loss. For Istanbul, almost 
all these procedures converge to a large earthquake associated with 
the Main Marmara Fault. On the basis of high conditional probabili-
ties associated with certain segments, an Mw=7.5 magnitude strike-slip 
earthquake associated with the rupturing of four segments in the Mar-
mara Sea is selected as the “Credible Worst Case” Scenario Earthquake 
(Figure 1). The source parameters of the Scenario Earthquake similar to 
the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake.
C. Geotechnical Conditions
For the description of the geotechnical conditions in Istanbul, in addi-
tion to detailed surface geology data, we evaluated approximately 300 
borehole investigations, 50 PS velocity logging, and 40 array micro-
tremor studies. For determining the soil classes, we adopted the 
NEHRP (1997) soil classification. This classification has international 
acceptance in the earthquake engineering profession and facilitates the 
differentiation of ground motion with respect to different site classes.10 
For proper assessment of the seismic risk in urban centers, the poten-
tial of the earthquake-induced ground failure hazard—such as lique-
faction, landslides, and surface fault rupture—needs to be determined. 
Ground failure potential is defined as the probability of occurrence, 
given the susceptibility of the ground and the opportunity exhibited by 
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Figure 1. Location of the IRREW system in Marmara region and scenario 
earthquake-based hazard in Istanbul.
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the severity of the ground motion. Techniques to evaluate the liquefac-
tion potential are well established and generally involve the prepara-
tion of two types of maps, one showing the liquefaction susceptibility 
and the other expressing the opportunity for critical levels of shaking. 
The susceptibility map of liquefaction for Istanbul and vicinity based 
on the Youd and Perkins (1978) methodology is provided in Erdik and 
colleagues.11
D. Ground Motion Modeling
Deterministic seismic hazard is computed to understand the spatial 
distribution of the earthquake ground motion that would result from 
a given (Scenario) earthquake. The assessment methodology involves 
the determination of the Scenario Earthquake, identification of proper 
attenuation relationships, and appropriate site-response quantifica-
tion. For this study, the deterministic hazard will be evaluated using 
median (50-percentile) intensity-based and spectral acceleration-based 
attenuation relationships.
Regional-specific intensity attenuation relationships developed on 
the basis of Anatolian earthquakes12 were considered for the quanti-
fication of seismic hazard on the basis of MSK intensities. In hazard 
assessments based on empirical intensity attenuations, the modifica-
tion of the ground motion has been traditionally expressed in terms of 
intensity changes empirically correlated with the ground conditions. 
Considering that this intensity attenuation has been assessed for aver-
age soil conditions in the region, the intensity map is modified to reflect 
the influence of geological conditions using modification rules similar 
to Evernden and Thomson.13 The local geology-specific increments 
vary between –0.4 (Cavusbasi Formation) and 1.1 (Bakirkoy, Gungo-
ren, Cukurcesme and Kusdili Alluvium). Site-dependent intensities 
for the Scenario Earthquake are presented in Figure 1. Using the dam-
age definitions of the 1998 European Macroseismic Scale (EMS-1998), 
a general understanding of damage from exposure to these intensity 
levels can be gained. For the vulnerability class where the general rein-
forced concrete multi-story building stock in Istanbul is located, EMS-
1998 provides the following damage definitions:
Intensity VII: A few buildings sustain moderate damage
Intensity VIII:  Many buildings suffer moderate damage; a few sub-
stantial to heavy damage
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Intensity IX:  Many buildings suffer substantial to heavy damage; a 
few very heavy damage
   (Where “Few” describes less than 20% and “Many” 
describes between 20% and 60%.)
E. Inventory of Elements at Risk
Buildings, population, lifeline systems, and socioeconomic activities 
constitute the “elements at risk” in urban areas. Buildings and life-
line systems are generally termed built environment. Building inven-
tory data is compiled from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
and State Statistical Institute, complemented by Turk Telekom analog 
maps, imagery from helicopter flights, and aerial and satellite imagery. 
Classification of buildings in Istanbul is essential to ensure a uniform 
interpretation of data and results. The building inventory uses the 
three basic categories of Structural Systems, Number of Stories, and 
Year of Construction. Each category is further subdivided into groups 
to yield 24 different building classes. The Istanbul metropolitan area 
was divided into grids as 0.005°×0.005° (approximately 400m × 600m) 
cells for the aggregation of hazard and physical inventory data. The 
day- and night-time populations of 28 districts were determined, and 
then assigned to the geo-cells in order to calculate the human losses 
due to a major earthquake. The population and building data for Istan-
bul were obtained from the State Statistics Institute. For the determi-
nation of day population, the Istanbul Transportation Master Plan, 
prepared by the Municipality of Istanbul Metropolitan in 1997, is being 
utilized.
F. Earthquake Vulnerabilities
There are two main approaches for generating vulnerability relation-
ships. The first approach is based on damage data obtained from field 
observations after an earthquake or from experiments. The second 
approach is based on numerical analysis of the structure, either through 
detailed time-history analysis or through simplified methods. The first 
approach used in developing vulnerability estimates is called the Expe-
rience Data approach. It is based on the fact that certain classes of con-
structed facilities tend to share common characteristics and experience 
similar types of damage in earthquakes. They play an indispensable 
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role in the fragility curve development study, because only they can be 
used to calibrate the vulnerability relationships developed analytically. 
Loss estimates using this approach are more valid when evaluating the 
risk of large portfolios of facilities than for individual facilities.
The EMS-1998, an updated version of the MSK-81 scale (MSK-1981), 
differentiates the structural vulnerabilities into six classes (A to F). 
Reinforced concrete buildings with low levels of earthquake-resistant 
design are assigned an average vulnerability class of C. Due to defi-
ciencies in design, concrete quality, and construction practices, the bulk 
of the reinforced concrete building stock in Istanbul is in this vulner-
ability class. EMS-1998 provides the following definitions of intensity, 
where “Few” describes less than 20% and “Many” describes between 
20% and 60%.
Intensity VI:  A few buildings of vulnerability class C sustain D1 
damage
Intensity VII:  A few buildings of vulnerability class C sustain D2 
damage
Intensity VIII:  Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D2 dam-
age, a few D3
Intensity IX:  Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D3 dam-
age, a few D4
Intensity X:  Many buildings of vulnerability class C suffer D4 dam-
age, a few D5.
The damage to reinforced concrete buildings are classified as:
D1:  Negligible to Slight Structural Damage (SD), Slight Non-Struc-
tural Damage (N-SD)
D2: Moderate damage (Slight SD, Moderate N-SD)
D3: Substantial to heavy damage (Moderate SD, Heavy N-SD)
D4: Very heavy damage (Heavy SD, very heavy N-SD)
D5: Destruction
Based on available empirical data as well as compilations from refer-
enced works and engineering interpretations, the vulnerability curves 
for the general mid-rise (4–8 story) R/C frame buildings in Turkey are 
provided in Figure 2. The horizontal axis indicates the range (uncer-
tainty) of MSK intensities and the vertical scale indicates the percent-
age loss for the five different damage grades, D1 through D5. This 
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vulnerability relationship compares favorably with those presented in 
Coburn and Spence.14 Considering the damage level relations between 
low, medium, and high-rise R/C frame structures, the vulnerability 
curves for low-rise (1–4 stories) and high-rise (≥ stories) R/C frame 
buildings are obtained by half a unit left shifting of the intensity scale 
in the horizontal axis of the vulnerability curves of the medium-rise 
R/C frame buildings.
The earthquake loss scenario developed for Istanbul has used build-
ing vulnerability relationships that express the percentage damage for 
each typified building group and in certain damage classes against 
the EMS-1998 intensity ranges and spectral displacements. The spec-
tral displacement-based building vulnerabilities (also called “fragility 
curves”) relate the probability of being in, or exceeding, a building 
damage state to a given spectral displacement demand parameter 
using the methodology developed in HAZUS (http://www.fema.gov/
hazus/). The most vulnerable building group is found to be medium-
rise (4–7 story) reinforced concrete frame buildings built prior to 1975. 
These are cast-in-situ reinforced concrete frame buildings with unre-
inforced masonry infill walls designed on the basis of outdated codes 
and generally suffering from reinforcement corrosion problems. In the 
majority, the ground floors are left open for shops, and irregular plan 
shapes are common due to irregular land lots and urban congestion.
Death tolls in earthquakes arise mostly from structural collapses 
and, to a lesser degree, collateral hazards. The number and severity 
Figure 2. Intensity based earthquake vulnerability relationships for 
mid-rise reinforced concrete buildings in Turkey.
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Table 2. Casualty Rates for Reinforced Concrete Structures for Istanbul
       Casualty Rates for R/C structures (%)
Injury Severity
Low 
Damage
Medium 
Damage
Heavy 
Damage
Very Heavy 
Damage
Severity 1 0.050 0.20 1 10–50
Severity 2 0.005 0.02 0.50 08–15
Severity 3 0 0 0.01 04–10
Severity 4 0 0 0.01 04–10
of casualties are strongly related to the extent of both structural and 
non-structural building damage. In smaller earthquakes, non-struc-
tural damages govern the number and type of casualties, whereas in 
stronger shakings, casualties are highly affected by structural dam-
ages, especially by the number of partially or totally collapsed struc-
tures. One of the major inputs necessary for earthquake casualty 
estimation is a correlation between the number and severity of injuries 
and the damage level of the structures. This, however, is not easily 
attainable due to the poor quality or lack of information in earthquake 
casualty data. Casualty for any given structure type, building damage 
level, and injury severity level can be calculated by the multiplication 
of Population per Building, Number of Damaged Buildings, and the 
Casualty Rate. Casualty rates for different building types are estab-
lished in HAZUS99 for urban settings in the United States. For other 
urban settings, appropriate casualty rates need to be developed using 
empirical earthquake damage and casualty data. The casualty rates for 
reinforced concrete structures in Turkey are given in Table 2.
The percentages given in the table above are to be multiplied by the 
number of people in the building at the time of the earthquake. Two 
different values are given in the column “Very Heavy Damage.” The 
smaller values are associated with the partial collapse of the building, 
whereas the larger values are given for total collapse (of the “pancake” 
type).
G. Physical and Human Losses Due to Earthquake
In order to perform building damage and loss analysis, the building 
inventory stock database should be provided for each geo-cell. The 
seismic hazard information in terms of intensities for Intensity-based 
analysis and spectral accelerations for Spectral Displacement-based 
analysis should also be aggregated at the center of the geo-cells (400 m 
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by 600 m). To compute the damage probability ratios intensity-based 
vulnerabilities and/or spectral displacement-based fragility curves 
for vulnerabilities associated with each building, class type should be 
specified. Economic losses associated with the general building stock 
are estimated using the building damage losses and costs for different 
structural damages of each building group. In order to estimate the 
number and severity of the casualties, the day and night-time popula-
tion for each building type in geo-cells should be provided, together 
with the casualty rates for each building class and damage grade.
On the basis of the two independent approaches (intensity-based 
and spectral displacement-based), a total of 35,000 to 40,000 build-
ings (about 5% of the total building stock) were estimated damaged 
beyond repair. Most of the casualties are expected in this damage 
group, especially in a subset of this group where the collapse will be 
of the worst pancake form. In pancaked buildings the floors pile up 
on top of each other, rendering very difficult conditions for search 
and rescue. Our estimate for pancaked buildings will be in the vicin-
ity of 5,000 to 6,000. The expected building damages, calculated by 
the intensity-based deterministic approach, is provided in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Intensity based distribution of all buildings damaged 
beyond repair (complete damage).
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Furthermore, about 70,000 buildings will receive extensive damage 
and 200,000 buildings will be moderately damaged. Both of these dam-
age groups are repairable. The total monetary losses due to building 
damages caused by the Scenario Earthquake are estimated to be in the 
range of $11 billion (Figure 4). Building damages are mostly concen-
trated in the densely populated districts located in the southwestern 
part of the city, such as Eminönü, Fatih, Zeytinburnu, Bakirköy, Bahçe-
lievler, the southern part of Küçükçekmece and Avcilar, and to a lesser 
degree, in districts such as Kadiköy, Maltepe, and Kartal, located in the 
southeastern part of Istanbul. Although situated in relatively farther 
locations from the causative fault, due to the building density and vul-
nerability conditions, the districts of Beyoglu, Eyüp and Bayrampasa 
are also expected to undergo high levels of damage. As the result of the 
analysis conducted for various structure types, the mid-rise reinforced 
concrete structures constructed before 1980 are found to constitute 
the most vulnerable building class. The expected casualties are calcu-
lated using both the intensity-based and the spectral displacement-
based approaches. The results for both the night-time and daytime 
population are obtained for the four levels of casualty severities from 
the spectral displacement-based approach. Thus, on the basis of these 
Figure 4. Distribution of direct financial losses due to building damage.
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two approaches, it is estimated that the death totals would vary from 
30,000 to 40,000. How many of the casualties in the serious injury 
class would be lost is difficult to estimate since it would depend on 
the post-earthquake emergency services. If we assumed that about 
one-third would be lost, that would bring the total estimate of deaths 
to the 40,000–50,000 level. Death distribution based on the intensity 
approach is presented in Figure 5. As the result of the intensity-based 
analysis, a total of about 600,000 households, and from the spectral-
based analysis, a total of about 430,000 households were assessed to 
be in need of shelter following the Scenario Earthquake. This amount 
constitutes an upper limit for expected shelter needs, since the conver-
sion of this number to total number of households is subject to some 
discussion, and the vacancy of some dwelling units should also be con-
sidered. These values are the best estimates for a Mw=7.5 earthquake 
at the closest position to Istanbul that can be provided in the absence of 
detailed building inventory and geotechnical data. The death figures, 
especially, entail large uncertainties arising from the time and date of 
the earthquake.
Figure 5. Distribution of deaths for a night-time scenario earthquake.
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H. Istanbul Earthquake Rapid Response and Early Warning System
To reduce losses in a disastrous earthquake in Istanbul, a dense strong-
motion network has been established. The Istanbul Earthquake Rapid 
Response and Early Warning System (IERREWS) is composed of two 
independent systems designed to provide pre-earthquake early warn-
ing and post-earthquake rapid response services. One hundred of the 
strong-motion recorders are stationed in dense settlements in the met-
ropolitan area of Istanbul in dial-up mode for Rapid Response infor-
mation generation (Figure 6). An additional ten strong-motion stations 
are sited at locations as close as possible to the Great Marmara Fault in 
on-line data transmission mode to enable earthquake Early Warning 
(Figure 7). IERREWS is designed and operated by Bogazici University 
with the logistical support of the Governorate of Istanbul, First Army 
Headquarters, and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. The construc-
tion of the system is realized by the GeoSig Inc. (http://www.geosig.
com) and Electrowatt-Ekono (www.ewe.ch) consortium. Communi-
cations are provided by ARIA GSM (http://www.aria.com.tr) service 
provider.
Figure 6. Rapid response stations.
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IERREWS consists of the following components:
•  Monitoring system composed of various sensors
•  Communication link (off-line for the Rapid Response and on-line 
for the Early Warning) that transmits data from the sensors to com-
puters
•  Data processing facilities that converts data to information
•  System that issues and communicates the Rapid Response informa-
tion and Early Warning
Earthquake Early Warning in urban and industrial areas allows for 
clean emergency shutdown of systems susceptible to damage, such 
as power stations, transportation, computer centers, and telephone 
systems. Currently such systems are either implemented or in the con-
struction or planning stage in Mexico, Romania, California, Japan, Tai-
wan, Turkey, and Greece. Systems currently in operation in Bucharest 
(http://www.infp.ro/publications/ews.htm) and Mexico (http://www.
gfz-potsdam.de/ewc98/abstract/espinosa.html) have the capability of 
issuing an earthquake Early Warning in advance by relying on signifi-
cant distances between the source and the populated urban regions.
Figure 7. Early warning stations.
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I. Rapid Response System
The Rapid Response component of IERREWS has the objective of pro-
viding:
•  Reliable information for accurate, effective characterization of the 
shaking and damage by other rapid post-earthquake maps (Shake, 
Damage, and Casualty maps) for rapid response
•  Recorded motion for post-earthquake performance analysis of struc-
tures
•  Empirical basis for long-term improvements in seismic microzona-
tion, seismic provisions of building codes and construction guide-
lines
•  Seismological data to improve the understanding of earthquake 
generation at the source and seismic wave propagation
Current examples internationally are the Rapid Response sys-
tems implemented in California (USGS, Caltech, and CDMG TriNet 
ShakeMaps—http://www.trinet.org/shake/, Caltech-USGS Broadcast 
of Earthquakes (CUBE) System http://www.gps.caltech.edu/~bryant/
cube.html, UC Berkeley Seismological Laboratory and USGS Menlo 
Park (REDI) www.seismo.berkeley.edu/seismo/redi), Taiwan (Earth-
quake Rapid Reporting System of CWB http://www.earth.sinica.edu.
tw/cdr/IASPEI/data/cwb/rapid.html) and Japan (Real-time Earthquake 
Assessment Disaster System in Yokohama—READY—http://www.city.
yokohama.jp/me/bousai/dppc/handout-e.html).
The Istanbul Earthquake Rapid Response system satisfies the COS-
MOS (Consortium of Organizations for Strong-Motion Observation 
Systems) Urban Strong-Motion Reference Station Guidelines (www.
cosmos-eq.org) for the location of instruments, instrument specifi-
cations, and housing specifications. The relative instrument spacing 
is about 2–3 km, which corresponds to about 3 wavelengths in firm 
ground conditions and more than 10 wavelengths for soft soils for hor-
izontally propagating 1 s shear waves. Strong-motion instruments are 
generally located at grade level in small- and medium-sized buildings, 
such that the motion recorded corresponds to that on the ground in the 
surrounding area. Site geology at stations has been characterized in 
general terms. Certain stations have borehole data. New borehole sur-
veys for other stations are being planned. For communication of data 
from the rapid response stations to the data processing center, and 
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for instrument monitoring, a reliable and redundant GSM commu-
nication system (backed up by dedicated landlines and a microwave 
system) is used, on the basis of a protocol agreement with the ARIA 
GSM Service provider. In normal times, the Rapid Response stations 
are being interrogated (for health and instrument monitoring) on a 
regular basis. Triggered by an earthquake, each station will process the 
streaming three-channel strong-motion data to yield the spectral accel-
erations at specific periods, 12 Hz filtered peak ground acceleration 
and peak ground velocity, and will send these parameters in the form 
of SMS messages at every 20 s directly to the main data center through 
the GSM communication system. The main data processing center is 
located in the Department of Earthquake Engineering, Kandilli Obser-
vatory and Earthquake Research Institute, Bogazici University (KOERI-
BU). A secondary center, located in the Seismological Laboratory of the 
same Institute, serves as a redundant center that can function in case 
of failure in the main one. Shake, damage, and casualty distribution 
maps will be automatically generated at the data centers after an earth-
quake and communicated to the end users within three minutes. Full-
recorded waveforms at each station can be retrieved using GSM and 
GPRS modems subsequent to an earthquake.
For the generation of Rapid Response information, two method-
ologies based on spectral displacements and instrumental intensities 
are coded into specific computer programs similar to HAZUS (http://
www.fema.gov/hazus/). Both of the methodologies essentially rely on 
the building inventory database, fragility curves, and the methodol-
ogy developments in the Istanbul Earthquake Risk Assessment Study 
conducted by the Department of Earthquake Engineering of Bogazici 
University.
For the computation of input ground motion parameters, spectral 
displacements obtained from the SMS messages sent from stations 
are interpolated to determine the spectral displacement values at the 
center of each geo-cell, using two-dimensional splines. The earthquake 
demand at the center of each geo-cell is computed using these spectral 
displacements. The instrumental intensity at each center of these geo-
cells is computed as a function of short-period spectral acceleration. 
Using the response spectra and the instrumental intensities, building 
damage and casualties are computed separately by using the spectral 
displacement-based and intensity-based fragility curves. The compu-
tations are conducted at the centers of a 0.01°×0.01° grid system com-
prised of geo-cells (1120 m×830 m) size. The building inventories (in 24 
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groups) for each geo-cell, together with their spectral displacement and 
intensity-based fragility curves, are incorporated into the software.
The casualties are estimated on the basis of the number of collapsed 
buildings and degree of damage. An example of a building damage 
map that results from randomly simulated strong-motion data is pro-
vided in Figure 8. For transmission of the Rapid Response information 
to the concerned agencies (Istanbul Governorate, Istanbul Municipal-
ity, and First Army Headquarters) digital radio modem and GPRS 
communication systems are used (Figure 9). The Rapid Response sys-
tem was successfully tested by the 06.05.2004 (Md=4.5) earthquake 
in the Marmara Sea. The distribution of Peak Ground Acceleration 
(PGA) in Istanbul caused by this earthquake is provided in Figure 10. 
Although this earthquake is recorded by 80% of the stations, needless 
to say it is not large enough to cause any damage.
J. Early Warning System
Key to earthquake early warning is a continuous communication link 
between seismic sensors (ideally deployed close to the seismic source) 
and a central processing facility. If the incoming ground motion data at 
the processing unit is classified as critical, the system issues a warning 
Figure 8. Examples of building damage map that results from a 
randomly simulated strong motion data.
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to endangered people or facilities. This thereby takes advantage of the 
fact that seismic waves propagate slower (3–6 km/s) than the electro-
magnetic waves used for transmission of the warning. Generally, the 
warning time is in the range of only a few up to 70 seconds, which 
depends on the distances between the seismic source, the recording 
instruments, and the endangered area or facility.
Configurations in which seismic sensors (accelerometers) are 
installed between a known source area and the user are called front-
detection systems. However, if the location of the seismic source is 
unknown in advance, the realization of the Early Warning system 
requires an expanded network of seismic instruments. In addition to 
Istanbul, the typical examples for front-detection systems are installed 
in Mexico15 and Romania,16 while large and complex fault systems like 
the San Andreas Fault zone in California demand complex-detection 
systems.
The response to an alert given by the earthquake Early Warning sys-
tem generally proceeds fully automatically:
•  High-speed trains and metros are slowed down or stopped to avoid 
derailment
•  Pipelines and gas lines are shut down to minimize fire hazards
Figure 9. Post-earthquake damage maps are sent to SAR Headquarters 
of the Governorate, Metropolitan Municipality and First Army.
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•  Manufacturing operations are shut down to inhibit likely damage to 
the equipment
•  Vital computer information is saved and disk heads are retracted 
away from the disk surface
The benefit of audio and visual alarms is subject to controversy, 
since they require proper training of people and reasonably long warn-
ing times. The Mexican Seismic Alert System (SAS) is the only public 
alarm system in the world. The warning time of 60–70 seconds, before 
the high amplitude shear and surface waves arrive at the capital Mex-
ico City (a distance of about 320 km from the Guerrero subduction 
zone), provides an almost perfect background for earthquake early 
warning.
Important progress in data transfers and real-time data processing 
in recent years alleviates previous restrictions on the realization of 
Early Warning systems. However, there are still unsolved problems; for 
example, the reliability of alerts and the question of liabilities incurred 
by the institution that issues the warning. In the mid-1950s, Japanese 
National Railways started the installation of simple alarm seismom-
eters—strictly speaking, this was no EWS—along their railway lines. 
Later, with the operation of the “bullet” trains Tokaido Shinkansen and 
Figure 10. Distribution of peak ground acceleration (PGA) in Istanbul 
caused by the 06.05.2004 (Md=4.5) earthquake in the Marmara Sea.
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Tohoku Shinkansen, this front alarm system was improved and alarm 
seismometers were installed every 20 km along the lines. The stations 
issue a warning whenever a preset level of horizontal ground accelera-
tion (40 gal) is exceeded. Trains in the vicinity of the respective alarm 
stations are automatically slowed down or stopped in order to avoid 
derailments. The contemporary Japanese Urgent Earthquake Detection 
and Alarm System (UrEDAS) consists of 30 strong-motion instruments 
capable of determining the area of sustained damage, using informa-
tion about magnitude and hypocenter obtained from P-wave observa-
tions (“P-wave alarm”). Ordinary alarm seismometers and UrEDAS 
are combined into the Japanese “Compact UrEDAS.”
In the Early Warning part of the IERREWS, ten strong-motion sta-
tions are located as close as possible to the Great Marmara Fault in 
“on-line” mode. Continuous telemetry of data between these stations 
and the main data center is realized with a digital spread spectrum 
radio modem system involving repeater stations selected in the region 
(Figure 7). Considering the complexity of fault rupture and the short 
fault distances involved, a simple and robust Early Warning algorithm, 
based on the exceeding of specified threshold time domain amplitude 
levels, is implemented. The band-pass filtered accelerations and the 
cumulative absolute velocity (CAV-time integral of the absolute accel-
eration) are compared with specified threshold levels. When any accel-
eration or CAV (on any channel) in a given station exceeds specific 
selectable threshold values it is considered a vote. Whenever we have 
two or three (selectable) station votes within a selectable time inter-
val, after the first vote, the first alarm is declared. The early warning 
information (consisting of three alarm levels) will be communicated 
to the appropriate servo shutdown systems of the recipient facilities, 
which will automatically decide proper action based on the alarm 
level. Depending on the location of the earthquake (initiation of fault 
rupture) and the recipient facility, the alarm time can be as high as 
about 8 s.
IV. Structural Health Monitoring
Instrumentation of the critical structures with earthquake strong-
ground-motion recorders monitor the vibrations (i.e., the structural 
response) during an earthquake. Comparison of these recordings with 
those taken before the earthquake can yield variations in structural 
response, with implications for structural damage and reduction of 
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earthquake worthiness. The currently monitored structures and facili-
ties in Istanbul (Figure 11) include the following.
Fatih Sultan Mehmet Suspension Bridge
The monitoring system, encompassing twelve tri-axial accelerometers, 
was installed in November 2001. The data, digitized at the source, is 
monitored by two parallel PC units. The acceleration data is transmit-
ted on-line to the analysis center at the Department of Earthquake 
Engineering, Bogazici University. The modal vibration parameters are 
monitored using the measured response.
Bogazici Suspension Bridge
In 1983 a structural health monitoring system was installed by the Gen-
eral Directorate of State Highways. This system is currently non-func-
tional. Ten temporary strong-motion recorders, installed in the deck 
temporarily by the Department of Earthquake Engineering, Bogazici 
University, will be operated pending the overhaul (or replacement) of 
the existing monitoring system.
Hagia Sophia
A network of strong-motion accelerometers, consisting of nine inter-
connected Kinemetrics SSA-2 units, has been operational in the struc-
Figure 11. Structures in Istanbul instrumented with earthquake 
strong motion recorders.
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ture since August 1991 as part of the effort to determine its earthquake 
worthiness. The instruments cover three levels. One instrument is at 
the ground level; four are located at the cornice level next to the spring-
ing points of the four main arches; and four are at the dome base level 
on the crowns of the main arches.
Suleymaniye
An accelerometer system consisting of eight individual Kinemetrics 
SSA-2 units operated in the Süleymaniye mosque between 1994 and 
1999. The system was replaced by an interconnected array of eight 
GeoSig recorders in 1999. The positioning of the instruments is simi-
lar to the Hagia Sophia array except that there is no instrument at the 
ground level.
Enron Power Plant
The earthquake monitoring network system for Enron-Trakya Elek-
trik Power Plant facilities includes eight on-line strong-ground-motion 
recorders distributed at critical locations within the industrial facility. 
The recorders are connected on-line to the main processing center to 
send nearly real-time data packets.
Is Bank Tower
Earthquake monitoring and alert systems were designed and installed 
to monitor the structural response and to generate earthquake alarm 
signals for the building facilities and emergency system. For this pur-
pose, four GSR-18 strong-ground-motion stations are utilized. The 
operational system is similar to that employed for the Enron Power 
Plant.
V. Conclusions
The effectiveness of using or disregarding earthquake risk mitigation 
techniques—building rehabilitation, adoption and enforcement of seis-
mic provisions in building codes, prudent community growth, and 
improved disaster response capabilities—are well known and have 
been demonstrated in Turkish cities and also throughout the world. 
The focal element of these mitigation activities is a technically sound 
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state-of-the-art assessment of the various levels of losses. Only by 
comprehending the consequences of earthquake losses in Istanbul can 
decisions be made at the governmental level about mitigation priori-
ties and optimal approaches.
In order to create an earthquake resilient city and society, earth-
quake hazard mitigation strategies, such as rehabilitation of existing 
vulnerable buildings, development of appropriate zoning ordinances, 
and enforcement of earthquake building codes, should be enforced. 
They would serve as a countermeasure against earthquake losses indi-
cated in the loss estimation study. In addition, the planning for con-
tingency measures—such as identification of alternate transportation 
routes, emergency response and recovery, identification of emergency 
shelter locations, availability of medical services, food, water and other 
essential utilities, and Rapid Response-Early Warning systems—needs 
to be maximized. •
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